Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money by Robert Newman et al.
                 
 
 
 
 
        DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
A Critique of “The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: 
An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign 
Money on the Judicial Function”   
 
 
 
 
Robert Newman 
Louisiana State University 
 
Janet Speyrer 
University of New Orleans 
 
Dek Terrell 
Louisiana State University 
 
                               Working Paper 2008-05 
http://www.bus.lsu.edu/economics/papers/pap08_05.pdf 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-6306 
http://www.bus.lsu.edu/economics/ 
  
A Critique of “The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An  
Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money 
on the Judicial Function” 
 
Robert Newman, Janet Speyrer and Dek Terrell
1 
 
  Palmer and Levendis’ (2008) offer a rather confusing and contradictory paper on 
the impact of campaign contributions on voting behavior by Louisiana Supreme Court 
justices.  The first two sentences provide a very good example of the paper’s fundamental 
flaws.  The first sentence asserts that no literature exists to guide their study, ignoring 
over twenty-five years of scholarly work directly related to the question of interest.  The 
second sentence provides the paper’s central thesis that it supplies statistical evidence that 
contributions influenced justices.  Yet a careful reading of the literature suggests that this 
paper contains no such evidence.  In an even more puzzling twist, footnote 14 of the 
Palmer and Levendis’ (2008) paper states that it will assert no such causal relationship. 
 
  The first step in any academic study is a careful review of the relevant literature.  
The first sentence of Palmer and Levendis’ (2008) paper (hereafter referred to as P&L) 
begins with the observation ―The effect of campaign contributions on judicial decision 
making has been the subject of the widespread interest and debate, but little empirical 
research.‖  Like much of the paper, the first sentence entirely misses the mark.  In fact, 
there  is  a  very  large  literature  in  economics  investigating  the  impact  of  campaign 
contributions on the decisions of recipients. Understanding the problems with Palmer and 
Levendis (2008) requires first placing it in the context of the literature.   
 
While  most  of  the  extant  evidence  comes  from  empirical  research  on  the 
relationship  between  campaign  contributions  and  decisions  of  legislators,  the 
methodological issues are identical for examining the same relationship with respect to 
decisions made by judges.  Beginning with Chappell’s (1982) seminal paper, the accepted 
approach  for  empirical  research  on  this  topic  must  explicitly  recognize  the  probable 
simultaneity between the effect of campaign contributions on judicial decisions and the 
effect  of  judicial  decisions  on  campaign  contributions.
2  His  paper  is  of  particular 
importance because it point s out a fatal flaw in the P &L analysis and  points to  the 
appropriate methodology the authors should have employed for estimation of this type of 
model. The necessity of addressing the simultaneity issue was  explicitly  stated in an 
influential study by Stratman (1995), which states in the introduction:  
 
  ―All studies addressing the question of whether campaign 
contributions influence congressional voting behavior must address 
                                                 
1 Author’s affiliations: Louisiana State University, University of New Orleans, and Louisiana State 
University 
2  Chappell’s  contribution  is  the  first  article  to  appear  when  one  searches  Google  scholar  under 
―contributions‖ and ―voting.‖ As of this writing, Google scholar shows 130 citations to Chappell’s  article. 
Many subsequent studies use his methodology and a number of those appear in the top rated journals in 
both economics and political science.   the issue of whether campaign contributions are endogenous in the 
vote equation.  The issue is whether contributions influence the 
voting  behavior  or  whether  the  expected  voting  behavior 
influences contributions.‖ (p. 127). 
 
  This mandate applies equally to all studies addressing the question of whether 
campaign contributions influence the decisions of judges. Thus, both studies seriously 
call into question P&L’s conclusion of a causal link between contributions and judicial 
decisions.  After  Chappell’s  work,  essentially  every  serious  work  on  the  topic  must 
address the fact that there are at least two relationships of interest, not one as the Tulane 
Law Review article implies. Any serious attempt to address the impact of contributions 
on the decisions of judges must use econometric techniques that recognize the two-way 
causality. Assuming away the simultaneity issue, as P&L implicitly have done, represents 
a  fundamentally  fatal  error  in  their  analysis.  The  possibility  that  differences  among 
judges  in  their  decisions  or  judicial  philosophies  can  influence  how  campaign 
contributions are distributed is conceptually identical to the influence legislator’s have on 
the distribution of campaign contributions. This has been well-recognized in economics 
for decades. For example, Grier and Munger (1986) show that specific characteristics of 
individual  legislators  attract  contributions  from  some,  but  not  necessarily  all  interest 
groups.  That  is,  interest  groups  that  value  certain  characteristics  contribute  to  the 
campaign of legislators who possess those characteristics.  
 
With just a cursory review of the literature, P&L would have found these studies 
and would have been aware of Stratman’s view that all studies must address this issue as 
central to their analysis.  Their failure to even cite these studies, much less address the 
key  issue,  reveals  a  fundamental  flaw  in  their  study.    However,  that  is  not  the  only 
important issue raised by the P&L paper. Many economic studies can miss a key item in 
the literature or err in methodology.  But, over time, subsequent research corrects the 
errors if the study is deemed interesting or research scholars may simply ignore the study, 
which implicitly deems it as having little value to the discipline. 
 
However, P&L paper is not the typical academic study. The methodology chosen 
by Palmer and Levendis, which entirely ignores the simultaneity issue, focuses on voting 
by  specific  justices  in  the  Louisiana  Supreme  Court.    The  authors  conclude  that 
contributions influenced the voting behavior of two justices in particular, and suggest that 
it is also true for the entire Court.  By naming specific Justices and incorrectly asserting 
that  they  have  produced  statistically  valid  evidence  that  campaign  contributions 
influenced decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the author’s risk tarnishing the 
reputations of longstanding Judges with no scientifically valid evidence to support their 
claims.  In this case, the profession’s process of simply ignoring poor scholarship or 
correcting it over time cannot prevent the immediate damage to reputations that the P&L 
study will produce under the guise of academic research. 
 
The critique proceeds by first discussing the problems in Palmer and Levendis 
(2008)  methodology.    We  then  focus  on  conclusions  drawn  by  the  authors  and  the language used to describe results.  Finally, we turn to the issue of publication and offer 
suggestions for a better review of similar articles for publication at a Law Review.   
 
Problems in the Palmer and Levendis Methodology 
 
  The key problem in the Palmer and Levendis’ methodology is that they fail to 
adequately model the contributor’s decision to donate to campaigns.  In fact, the results in 
Palmer and  Levendis  fall apart under  closer inspection.   To understand the problem, 
suppose Palmer and Levendis had performed a similar study focusing on whether U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices were unduly influenced by the support of pro-life or pro-choice 
groups  during  confirmation  hearings.    It  would  come  as  no  surprise  to  find  that  the 
Christian Coalition and other pro-life groups supported (contributed heavily) to justices 
such as Clarence Thomas, while pro-choice groups voiced opposition to Justice Thomas 
but showed support (contributed heavily) for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  When one 
later looks at voting records by Justices, the status of plaintiff and defendant may vary.  
However, regardless of the plaintiff and defendant in the case, Justice Thomas is more 
likely to favor restricting abortion rights than Ginsburg.  Does this imply that the Justices 
decisions are unduly influenced by support of pro-life or pro-choice groups during the 
confirmation  hearings?    No,  it  simply  shows  that  the  judicial  temperament  and 
philosophy of justices on this one issue were known by the two groups and therefore 
influenced their support decisions. 
 
  Chappell’s  (1982)  seminal  article  pointed  out  that  the  same  idea  holds  for 
campaign contributions.  If the U.S. Supreme Court were elected and received campaign 
contributions, would one really expect pro-life groups to contribute to Justice Ginsburg?  
If  not,  then  one  is  sure  to  only  observe  financial  contributions  to Justice  Ginsburg’s 
campaign by pro-choice groups.  However, the fact that Justice Ginsburg tends to rule in 
favor of pro-choice positions has nothing to do with unfair influence by contributors.  It 
just reflects the fact that the Justice votes as anticipated in those cases. Therefore, it 
seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that  it  was  her  ―voting  behavior‖  that  influenced  the 
decisions of contributors.  Furthermore, it is naïve, at best, to assume that one can control 
for Judicial philosophy across a broad range of issues on the basis of the number of times 
a justice rules for the plaintiff or defendant. 
 
  If  only  a  very  small  number  of  cases  fall  into  the  category  discussed  above, 
P&L’s results would evaporate.  To see this, consider the results for Judge Kimball in 
Table  3.    Note  that  P&L  make  much  of  the  fact  the  Justice  Kimball  voted  for  the 
defendant in 24 of 36 cases (67%) where a contributor is involved and only 52% of cases 
where a contributor was not involved.  For simplicity, let’s round the 52% to 50% and 
make the Palmer and Levendis case a bit stronger. 
 
  Assume  that  there  are  two  types  of  cases.    Type  A  is  a  case  where  Justice 
Kimball’s  decision  could  not  be  predicted  by  contributors  based  on  her  judicial 
philosophy. Type B is a case where Justice Kimball’s position could have been predicted 
based on judicial philosophy, much as Justice Thomas’ votes on abortion issues might be 
predictable.  How many of the latter type cases would be necessary to explain the results in Table 3?  In a deterministic world, the results in Table 3 would require that there were 
24  Type  A  cases  involving  contributors  where  Justice  Kimball’s  vote  could  not  be 
predicted and another 12 Type B cases where contributors could have anticipated.  This 
leads to 12 votes of 24 in favor of the defendant in Type A cases and another 12 Type B 
cases. 
 
However, as the author’s correctly note, there is an element of randomness in the 
cases that one should take into account. When one allows for randomness, a quick check 
of the binomial distribution reveals that it would not be surprising to find 18 out of 30 
cases (60%) in favor of the defendant, even if the probability of ruling for the defendant 
in any single case is .5.  Thus, when one accounts for randomness, Justice Kimball’s 
voting record can be explained by only six Type B cases where contributors could have 
anticipated her opinion.  In essence, the P&L’s statistical evidence falls apart if Justice 
Kimball’s voting behavior were predictable in 6 of the 94 cases that were included in this 
sample.
3  If Chief Justice Roberts had been an elected judge at some point in his career, 
results such as these would not be at all surprising. 
 
Given the discussion above, the past literature in economics,  and our own priors 
about  judicial temperament, it is  not  surprising that P&Ls find  positive  correlations 
between contributions and votes.  The logit results also suffer from the same criticism as 
those  in  Table  3.    Fortunately ,  Chappell’s  (1982)  study  developed  the  appropriate 
econometric  tools  to  address  this  issue,  which  was  extended  in  later  work  such  as 
Stratman  (1995).  While  the  description  of  the  construction  of  the  data  set  and  the 
specification of the logit model in Palmer and Levendis is vague, it is clear that they 
relied on a single equation logit model. This is the fatal flaw in their methodology. 
 
To understand the problem, note that Palmer and Levendis use a specification 
similar to the single equation specification of Durden and Silberman (1976).  Chappell’s 
seminal paper was to a large extent written as a critique of the Durden and Silberman 
study.  In essence, Chappell noted that randomly assigning contributors to a candidate 
ignores the fact that donors tend to contribute to candidates with a similar viewpoints.  To 
use our earlier analogy, pro-choice groups would only contribute to candidates viewed as 
supporting  the  pro-choice  position.    Econometrically,  this  means  that  the  level  of 
contributions is jointly endogenous and mandates the estimation of a second equation.   
 
Chappell  correctly  addresses  the  econometric  problems  using  a  logit-Tobit 
approach. Using data from several congressional votes, Chappell’s shows that the single 
equation model is biased.  In Chappell’s words: 
 
―FIML estimates of the simultaneous probit-Tobit model suggest that 
the  effects  of  campaign  contributions  on  voting  are  smaller  than 
single equation probit estimates would indicate.  We are generally 
unable to  conclude that contributions  have a significant  impact  on 
voting decisions; apparently votes are most often decided on the basis 
                                                 
3 The results for Justice Weimer can also be explained by only six predictable votes.  However, it should be 
noted that there are fewer of Weimer’s cases included in the study. of  personal  ideology  or  the  preferences  of  constituents.    These 
findings differ markedly from Durden and Silberman, whose single 
equation  models  showed  a  substantial  impact  of  contributions  on 
voting decisions.‖ 
 
The  findings  of  Chappell  and  sample  size  of  the  Palmer  and  Levendis  study 
strongly  suggest  that  all  of  the  evidence  of  a  relationship  between  contributions  and 
voting by justices  would disappear if the correct probit-Tobit specification was used.  
Given the standard econometric approaches at the time and computing power available, 
Durden  and  Silberman’s  estimation  of  a  single  equation  model  was  to  be  expected.  
However, Palmer and Levendis’ choice of an almost identical single equation model over 
40 years later is inexcusable. 
 
  Less troubling results in Palmer and Levendis’ study might be found in Table 5.  
Though Stratman’s work is not cited, P&L do come to a similar conclusion—timing of 
contributions may matter. That is, more recent contributions might have a larger impact 
on voting behavior than contributions made in the past.  Stratmann used a three equation 
model  –  a  probit  equation  for  voting  and  two  Tobit  equations  for  predicting  the 
contributions of donors during the year of the vote and the two years prior to the vote.   
 
  Palmer and Levendis note that 37 contributions in their data set occurred within 
one  year  of  a  decision.    Though  Stratman’s  methodology  used  a  system  of  three 
equations,  his  work  does  offer  hope  that  a  single  equation  model  using  recent 
contributions  might  provide  useful  results.    However,  instead  of  using  only  those 
contributions within the last year, Palmer and Levendis use all 157 contributions over a 
14 year period (1992 to 2006), and simply discount contributions using a 5% discount 
rate.  This methodology makes it impossible to determine whether the results are driven 
by 37 recent contributions or the 123 older contributions, particularly since the timing of 
contributions is likely to vary across Justices.   
 
Interestingly, Palmer and Levendis issue a rather puzzling disclaimer in footnote 
14 of their paper related to this issue.  Footnote 14 of P&L states:  
 
―It is worth observing that this article does not claim that there is a 
cause  and  effect  relationship  between  prior  contributions  and 
judicial votes in favor of donors’ positions.  It asserts instead that 
there is evidence of a statistical correlation between the two.‖   
 
In layman’s terms this footnote states that the authors make no assertion with 
regard  to  whether  the  correlations  imply  that  contributions  affect  voting  behavior  or 
instead simply reflect  the fact  that  contributions  tend to  flow to those that share the 
donor’s point of view.  Apparently the authors completely miss the significance of this 
footnote.  To any trained econometrician, this footnote states that the article makes no 
assertion that it contains statistical evidence that contributions affect voting behavior 
of justices. 
 In  light  of  footnote  14,  the  rest  of  the  paper  is  completely  confusing.    The 
majority of the paper either implicitly or explicitly interprets statistical correlations as 
implying a causal relationship where donations influence voting.  If P&L were really 
taking an agnostic position on causality, the paper should clearly discuss the alternative 
explanation discussed above.   Given that footnote, all results should be discussed in 
terms of both possible explanations. 
 
P&L’s  repeated  assertions  that  donations  influence  voting  behavior  directly 
contradict footnote 14.  In light of these assertions, it is very surprising that P&L do not 
employ the logit-Tobit model that was introduced by Chappell (1982) over twenty five 
years ago to test for evidence of such a causal relationship. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This  critique  evaluates  the  Palmer  and  Levendis’  (2008)  Tulane  Law  Review 
article  which  asserts  that  it  contains  evidence  that  campaign  contributions  have 
influenced voting behavior of Louisiana Supreme Court Justices.  The key goal of this 
critique is to point out a very fundamental flaw in P&L and to point other scholars to the 
appropriate literature describing the correct way to do a study of this sort.  Chappell’s 
(1982) seminal work and later work by Stratman (1995) provide the basic methodology 
for this type of research.   
 
The P&L paper is written as if the authors are discovering new problems and 
attempting to address them using a new approach.  In fact, economists recognized these 
problems over 30 years ago and developed solutions, which have been thoroughly vetted 
in leading journals.       
 
Palmer and Levendis’ (2008) failure to investigate the literature leads them to 
employ ―modern statistical analysis‖
4 that Chappell (1982) dismissed over twenty five 
years ago as inadequate for this problem.  The authors’ seem to grasp this problem in 
footnote  14  where  they  note  that  their  paper  will  make  no  assertion  with  regard  to 
causality.    In  essence,  footnote  14  states  that  Palmer  and  Levendis  (2008)  will  not 
interpret  results  found  in  the  paper  as  implying  that  contributions  influence  voting 
behavior.  Yet, they repeatedly make exactly the assertion that footnote 14 of their paper 
correctly  acknowledges  cannot  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  statistical  techniques 
employed in the paper. 
 
In summation, Palmer and Levendis’ (2008) failure to investigate this literature 
leaves them with an article consisting essentially of totally invalid statistical results and 
unsubstantiated assertions.   We hope that future research using more careful econometric 
analysis might be able to provide more useful evidence on the topic of interest. 
                                                 
4 Palmer and Levendis (2008), Tulane Law Review, page 1314.  
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